US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, & Publications
3-18-2019

The Army Role in Achieving Deterrence in Cyberspace
Jeffrey L. Caton

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey L. Caton, The Army Role in Achieving Deterrence in Cyberspace ( US Army War College Press,
2019),
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/380

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, & Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

The United States Army War College
The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service
at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application
of Landpower.
The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates
who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently,
it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders
and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage
in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving
national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national
security and strategic research and analysis to influence
policy debate and bridge the gap between military
and academia.
The Center for Strategic Leadership contributes
to the education of world class senior leaders,
develops expert knowledge, and provides solutions
to strategic Army issues affecting the national
security community.
The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
provides subject matter expertise, technical review,
and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability
operations concepts and doctrines.
The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic
leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom
grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and
by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in
the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional
expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security,
resource management, and responsible command.
The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires,
conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use
to support the U.S. Army, educate an international
audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

i

STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War
College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related
to national security and military strategy with emphasis on
geostrategic analysis.
The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct
strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:
• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined
employment of military forces;
• Regional strategic appraisals;
• The nature of land warfare;
• Matters affecting the Army’s future;
• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,
• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.
Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern
topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of
Defense, and the larger national security community.
In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics
of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings
of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip
reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.
The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the
Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army
participation in national security policy formulation.
iii

Strategic Studies Institute
and
U.S. Army War College Press
THE ARMY ROLE IN ACHIEVING DETERRENCE
IN CYBERSPACE

Jeffrey L. Caton

March 2019
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the
U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy
full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified
information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent
official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to
offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest
of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public
release; distribution is unlimited.
∗∗∗∗∗
This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections
101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.

v

∗∗∗∗∗
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be
forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army
War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn Drive,
Carlisle, PA 17013-5238.
∗∗∗∗∗
This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War College
External Research Associates Program. Information on this
program is available on our website, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/,
at the Opportunities tab.
∗∗∗∗∗
All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War
College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free
of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of certain reports
may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing
an order on the SSI website. Check the website for availability.
SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full
with permission and appropriate credit given to the U.S. Army
Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press,
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our
website at the following address: http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/.
∗∗∗∗∗
The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College
Press publishes a quarterly email newsletter to update the national
security community on the research of our analysts, recent and
forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored
by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic
commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested
in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at
the following address: http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-798-7
vi

FOREWORD
The U.S. tradition of pursuing national-level deterrence has developed and evolved significantly since
the introduction of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Since
the United States has stated publicly that it has vital
interests in cyberspace, it is prudent for the Nation to
achieve deterrence in this relatively new realm. In this
monograph, Mr. Jeffrey L. Caton examines the implications for the U.S. Army to support such an endeavor.
He analyzes existing policy and strategy documents,
written at the departmental and executive level, as
well as the international commitments that they may
embody. He also explores the concepts of deterrence
in cyberspace in the context of traditional deterrence
utilizing all forms of national power, as well as aspects
potentially unique to cyberspace. He argues that mechanisms of cyberspace deterrence exist whether we are
aware of them or not, and that without proper coordination, such deterrence measures may escalate the
conflict to levels undesired by either party. Further,
he asserts that if military professionals do not seek to
study these mechanisms, the Nation’s military cyberspace operations may be conducted by those who are
unenlightened as to the larger context and stakes of
tactical- and operational-level cyber exchanges. Thus,
this monograph aims to inform the ongoing activities
of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) as well as
individual Service cyberspace organizations.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Strategic deterrence has been a significant issue for
the Department of Defense (DoD) for over 70 years, but
many limit this concept to the use of nuclear weapons.
The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy explicitly calls for a comprehensive strategy to provide credible deterrence in
cyberspace against threats from key state and nonstate
actors. To be effective, such activities must be coordinated with ongoing deterrence efforts in the physical
realm, especially those of near-peers impacting critical
global regions such as China in the Asia-Pacific region
and Russia in Europe. It is important for the Army to
identify and plan for any unique roles that they may
provide to these endeavors.
This monograph is divided into three major sections. The first section addresses the question: What
is the current U.S. deterrence posture for cyberspace?
The discussion will include an assessment of relevant
current national and DoD policies and concepts as well
as an examination of key issues for cyber deterrence
found in professional literature. The second section
examines the question: What are the Army’s roles in
cyberspace deterrence? It provides background information on how Army cyber forces operate and examines the potential contributions of these forces to the
deterrence efforts prescribed in the DoD Cyber Strategy,
as well as to broader DoD strategic deterrence efforts.
The section addresses how the priority of these contributions may change with escalating levels of conflict. The final section provides recommendations for
changing or adapting DoD and Army responsibilities
to better define and implement the evolving concepts
and actions supporting deterrence in the dynamic
domain of cyberspace.

xi

The discussion in this monograph is limited to
unclassified and publicly available sources of information available before October 2017. Since some of the
issues addressed herein are well documented in many
sources, this monograph serves as a primer on current
and future cyberspace deterrence activities for senior
policymakers, decision makers, military leaders, and
their staffs. This monograph includes recommendations related to strategic and regional applications for
deterrence, potential synergy of various forms of military deterrence, and the possibility of creating a cybertriad deterrence concept.
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THE ARMY ROLE IN ACHIEVING DETERRENCE
IN CYBERSPACE
Strategic deterrence has been a significant issue for
the Department of Defense (DoD) for over 70 years,
but many limit this concept to the use of nuclear weapons (or perhaps, the lack thereof). The April 2015 DoD
Cyber Strategy emphasizes the increased need for credible deterrence in cyberspace:
In the face of an escalating threat, the Department of
Defense [DoD] must contribute to the development and
implementation of a comprehensive cyber deterrence
strategy to deter key state and nonstate actors from
conducting cyberattacks against U.S. interests. (p. 10)

Ideally, such deterrence must consider and address
both state and nonstate actors. A cyber deterrence
strategy must be coordinated with ongoing deterrence
efforts in the physical realm, especially those of nearpeers impacting critical global regions such as China
in the Asia-Pacific region and Russia in Europe to be
effective. It is important for the Army to identify and
plan for any unique roles that they may provide to
these endeavors.
This monograph is divided into three major sections. The first section addresses the question: What
is the current U.S. deterrence posture for cyberspace?
The discussion includes an assessment of relevant current national and DoD policies and concepts as well
as an examination of key issues for cyber deterrence
found in professional literature. The second section
examines the question: What are the Army’s roles in
cyberspace deterrence? It provides background information on how Army cyber forces operate and examines the potential contributions of these forces to the
deterrence efforts prescribed in the DoD Cyber Strategy,
as well as to broader DoD strategic deterrence efforts.
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This section addresses how the priority of these contributions may change with escalating levels of conflict. The final section provides recommendations for
changing or adapting DoD and Army responsibilities
to better define and implement the evolving concepts
and actions supporting deterrence in the dynamic
domain of cyberspace.
The discussion in this monograph is limited to
unclassified and publicly available sources of information. Since some of the issues addressed herein are
well documented in many sources, this study serves
as a primer on current and future cyberspace deterrence activities for senior policymakers, decision-makers, military leaders, and their staffs.
CURRENT U.S. DETERRENCE POSTURE
FOR CYBERSPACE
This section examines the current approach of the
U.S. Government to cyberspace deterrence in three
ways. First, it reviews national policy and strategy;
next, it explores the relevant DoD policies and concepts; and finally, it surveys common issues and
challenges contained in professional literature. Any
mention of classical or traditional deterrence theory
usually refers to the policies and strategies developed
during the Cold War to guide the use of nuclear weapons. Unless otherwise noted, this monograph will use
the current joint definition of deterrence as “the prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat
of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the
cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits.”1 Recognizing that operational deterrence is part of any
joint campaign plan, this study emphasizes strategic
level deterrence that provides the “backbone” deterrence that enables all global and regional operations.
2

National Deterrence Policy
What seems clear is that our adversaries have reached
a common conclusion: that the reward for attacking
America in cyberspace outweighs the risk. For years, cyber
attacks on our Nation have been met with indecision and
inaction. Our Nation has no policy and thus no strategy
for cyber deterrence. This appearance of weakness has
been provocative to our adversaries who have attacked
us again and again with growing severity. Unless we
demonstrate that the costs of attacking the United States
outweigh the perceived benefits, these cyber attacks will
only grow. 2
—Senator John McCain, January 5, 2017

Senator McCain’s introductory comments at the
start of a Senate Armed Services Committee testimony
summed up his perspective on the serious nature
of cyber deterrence. He indicated that the task went
beyond mere cyber means, stating that successful
cyber deterrence requires restored credibility of U.S.
deterrence writ large. The senator then summed up
perhaps the greatest challenge in this venture: “What
is our theory of cyber deterrence, and what is our
strategy to implement it?”3
Several U.S. Government leaders offered their
assessments in response to these questions. Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Marcel J. Lettre
II, admitted that work remains in the refinement of
a “national cyber policy framework” that has a foundation of denial, imposition of costs, and resilience.4
Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper,
Jr., had a more pessimistic appraisal: “We currently
cannot put a lot of stock, at least in my mind, in cyber
deterrence.” He asserted that the “ephemeral” nature
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of cyberspace limits the “substance and psychology”
required for effective deterrence.5 Certainly, one might
argue the antithesis of Clapper’s opinion, in that the
very uncertain and unpredictable nature of cyber
operations may add to its value. Admiral Michael
Rogers, commander, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) noted that while defense is an integral part
of a cyber deterrence strategy, defensive actions alone
are not sufficient:
We have got to ask ourselves how do we change this
broader dynamic . . . how do we convince nations and
other actors that there is a price to pay for this behavior,
that in fact it is not in your best interest.6

Senator McCain’s statement is accurate regarding
the lack of a national cyber deterrence strategy; however, there is an official cyber deterrence policy. In
December 2015, the White House submitted a policy
report to Congress that “offers an initial roadmap
for the United States Government’s departments and
agencies to identify their role in the United States’
cyber deterrence efforts, to execute on specific lines of
effort, and to develop plans for the future.”7
Figure 1 summarizes some of the key themes in
current U.S. national cyber deterrence policy. Key
tenets of the policy include:
improved defenses, more resilient architectures, and a
range of options—cyber and non-cyber—to inflict costs
and to hold accountable adversaries that choose to
conduct cyber attacks or other malicious activity against
U.S. interests.8

The policy rests upon deterrence by denial and deterrence by cost imposition, both of which are supported by whole-of-government and whole-of-nation

4

capabilities, declaratory statements and strategic communications, intelligence capabilities, international
engagement, and research and development.9 Senator McCain criticized the policy for not introducing
any new information as well as not providing details
on how the Nation should “integrate ends, ways and
means to meaningfully deter attacks in cyberspace.”10
While it is true that the policy did not provide an
actionable strategy, it was nonetheless a vast improvement over the 2015 National Security Strategy, which
was devoid of any reference to cyber deterrence.11

Figure 1. U.S. National Cyber Deterrence—
Current Policy Focus
Much of the 2015 White House cyber policy was
derived from the 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace, which laid out policy priorities in the areas of
5

the economy, network protection, law enforcement,
military operations, Internet governance, international development, and freedom and privacy.12 More
importantly, it dedicated a section to discuss dissuasion and deterrence with respect to protecting U.S.
networks, which included a surprisingly frank declaratory statement:
When warranted, the United States will respond to
hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat
to our country. All states possess an inherent right to
self-defense, and we recognize that certain hostile acts
conducted through cyberspace could compel actions
under the commitments we have with our military treaty
partners. We reserve the right to use all necessary means—
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—as
appropriate and consistent with applicable international
law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners,
and our interests. In so doing, we will exhaust all options
before military force whenever we can; will carefully
weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs of
inaction; and will act in a way that reflects our values and
strengthens our legitimacy, seeking broad international
support whenever possible.13

The most recent update to the national cyber deterrence policy can be found in the March 2016 Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy. It
echoes the key themes of pursuing cyber deterrence
through a combination of denial and cost imposition
as well as the use of tailored approaches that leverage
the full range of national instruments of power.14 The
strategy also endeavors to provide the President with
a wide range of options that leverage resources from
the DoD, the Department of Justice, the Department
of Homeland Security, and the Department of State.15
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DoD Deterrence Policy and Concepts
In his April 2017 congressional testimony, General
John Hyten, commander, U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM), provided a modern context for his
command’s primary mission:
in the 21st century, strategic deterrence is more than
nuclear. It is the integration of all our capabilities in all
domains across all the combatant commands, other
governmental organizations, and alongside our allies.16

He also commented on the changing nature of deterrence from the perspective of our adversaries:
Well, I look at the evidence, and the evidence is when
we de-emphasize nuclear weapons, both our primary
adversaries, Russia and China, have both increased their
focus on nuclear weapons… They also looked at now
threatening space and threatening cyberspace. They went
a significant direction and a different deterrent element
than we did. So I believe you always have to look at your
adversaries and understand what they do and then make
sure you are in a position of strength relative to your
adversaries. That is what deterrence is all about.17

General Hyten’s remarks amplify some of the
priorities that were established in the 2015 National
Military Strategy, which put “Maintain a secure and
effective nuclear deterrent” at the top of its list of joint
force prioritized missions.18 While the 2015 strategy
does discuss the importance of deterring potential
adversaries in regional conflicts, it does not address
any role of cyberspace activities in strategic or regional
deterrence. This lack of emphasis is consistent with the
content of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, which
averred that the foundational aspect of nuclear deterrence was “the ultimate protection against a nuclear
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attack on the United States, and through extended
deterrence, it also serves to reassure our distant allies
of their security against regional aggression.”19 The
2014 review links space systems and missile defense to
strategic deterrence but does not mention cyberspace
operations in the same context.20
The most recent DoD publication that deals directly
with matters of military deterrence is the 2006 Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DOJOC).21 It
was written before USCYBERCOM was formed and
when key concepts related to cyberspace were discussed in terms of computer network operation that
were a subset of joint information operations.22 The
central idea of the DOJOC is presented in an endways-means paradigm. In this model, the end of
joint deterrence operations is “to decisively influence
the adversary’s decision-making calculus” toward a
goal “to convince potential adversaries that courses
of action that threaten US vital interests will result in
outcomes that are decisively worse than they could
achieve through alternative courses of action available to them.”23 The DOJOC ways are a threefold set of
actions that echo traditional deterrence actions: denying benefits, imposing costs, and encouraging adversary restraint.24 Joint deterrence means are considered
as four direct activities (force projection, active and
passive defense, global strike, and strategic communication) and five enabling activities (global situational
awareness, command and control, forward presence,
security cooperation, and deterrence assessment).25
For deterrence implementation, the DOJOC addresses
the need to tailor deterrence operations to specific
adversaries and strategic contexts as well as the practical matters of dealing with multiple decision makers
in a dynamic and uncertain environment. Finally, the
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document identifies anticipated sources of risk and
provides a potential means of mitigation.26
The DOJOC contains several overt references to
cyberspace activities related to the global aspects of
deterrence. In considering future adversaries, it notes
the challenges presented by commercially available
capabilities in cyberspace that can provide a global
reach to nonstate actors.27 The DOJOC also identifies cyber systems as a method to achieve Global
Strike effects at high speeds over extended distances.28 An illustrative example of deterrence provided
in a DOJOC appendix presents an interesting role for
cyberspace to sabotage adversary acquisition activities
and undermine relationships with third-party actors.29
In the self-assessment of how the DOJOC incorporates
linkages to joint capability areas, it recognizes the
growing significance of cyberspace activities, noting
that the areas of joint information operations, public
affairs operations, and shaping “do not adequately
cover the emerging cyberspace warfare requirements.”30 A significant challenge for evolving cyberspace deterrence will be to establish and ensure the
credibility of threatened offensive applications. The
DOJOC recommends, “Key elements of Global Strike
capabilities should be periodically demonstrated
openly on the world stage—to ensure adversary decision-makers fully comprehend the credible threats
they face.”31 How does one accomplish this for offensive cyberspace operations (OCO) without revealing
the vulnerabilities that the cyberweapon may exploit?
Do more recent DoD documents address such issues?
The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy emphasizes deterrence as an objective under its Strategic Goal III: “Be
prepared to defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. vital
interests from disruptive or destructive cyberattacks of
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significant consequence.”32 One of the five objectives
for this goal is for USSTRATCOM to “Assess DoD’s
cyber deterrence posture and strategy” to determine
in part if the DoD is building the right capabilities to
deter key cyberspace threats, especially those associated with nonstate actors.33 The DoD Cyber Strategy envisions three key elements of cyber deterrence:
response, denial, and resilience. It notes that deterrence is not limited to military actions, but is achieved
“through the totality of U.S. actions, including declaratory policy, substantial indications and warning
capabilities, defensive posture, effective response procedures, and the overall resiliency of U.S. networks
and systems.”34 Further, the strategy calls for collective deterrent efforts with other nations in its Strategic Goal V: “Build and maintain robust international
alliances and partnerships to deter shared threats
and increase international security and stability.”35
Also, collaboration with private and whole-of-government is required to help face the challenge of attack
attribution, which is “especially important for deterrence as activist groups, criminal organizations, and
other actors acquire advanced cyber capabilities over
time.”36 The DoD Cyber Strategy concludes that a DoD
cyberspace deterrence is not sufficient without a comprehensive national cyber deterrence strategy in place
to guide the complex array of resources and methods
available domestically and internationally.37 Although
the national cyber deterrence policy announced by the
White House in December 2015 was a step in the right
direction, no such comprehensive cyber deterrence
strategy has come forth yet.
To more fully explore the concept of cyber deterrence, the Defense Science Board (DSB) conducted a
2-year study “to identify critical capabilities (cyber and
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non-cyber) needed to support deterrence, warfighting,
and escalation control against a highly cyber-capable
adversary.”38 The DSB Task Force on Cyber Deterrence
report was published in February 2017, and it defines
cyber deterrence as “the use of both deterrence by
denial and deterrence by cost imposition to convince
adversaries not to conduct cyber attacks or costly
cyber intrusions against the United States.”39 The DSB
study addresses three types of adversaries: major
powers/near-peer (China, Russia); lesser regional
powers (Iran, North Korea); and other state and nonstate actors who can stage “persistent cyber attacks
and costly cyber intrusions.”40 The report emphasizes
that the aspects of denial and cost imposition should
not be mutually exclusive; rather, both should be used
in an appropriate balance of deterrence activities.
Also, the report provides eight guiding principles to
help define the context of its review and findings.41
The findings and recommendations of the 2017
DSB Task Force on Cyber Deterrence report are organized into three groups. The first, “Plan and Conduct Tailored Deterrence Campaigns,” emphasizes
campaign planning and wargaming with combatant
commands as well as the development of “an array of
scalable offensive cyber capabilities.”42 The next group
is “Create a Second-Strike Cyber Resilient ‘Thin Line’
Element of U.S. Military Forces,” which reaffirmed the
findings of a 2013 DSB study by arguing that “Scalable
military strike capabilities—including offensive cyber,
non-nuclear long-range strike, and nuclear systems—
are the foundation of U.S. deterrence by cost-imposition.”43 To ensure such a force is up to the deterrence
task at hand, the report advocates the development of
a National Security Agency-based standing Red Team
to test the capabilities of this combined strike force.44
The final group of recommendations addresses the
11

need to “Enhance Foundational Capabilities” that
include attribution determination, resiliency measures,
and critical infrastructure protection.45 The report also
makes a brief mention of the need to pursue extended
deterrence with allies and partners as well as the need
for USCYBERCOM to continue to build a “top-notch
cyber cadre.”46
Many of the themes explored in the 2017 DSB
report have their origin in the 2013 DSB Task Force
Report: Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber
Threat, a study that set out “to improve the resilience
of DoD systems to cyber attacks.”47 The study categorized cyberthreats into six tiers that ranged from
nuisance to existential, and its analysis expanded traditional deterrence concepts, noting that “the cyber
threat is serious, with potential consequences similar in some ways to the nuclear threat of the Cold
War.”48 The report came to a similar conclusion, and
it asserted a controversial view that “While the manifestation of a nuclear and cyber attack are very different, in the end, the existential impact to the United
States is the same,” and could potentially be achieved
through attacks on critical infrastructure.49 To address
this threat, the report argues that an effective response
should include “elements of deterrence, mission assurances, and offensive cyber capabilities.”50
With regard to national strategic deterrence, one
of the 2013 DSB report’s key recommendations was to
“Determine the Mix of Cyber, Protected-Conventional,
and Nuclear Capabilities Necessary for Assured Operation in the Face of a Full-Spectrum Adversary.”51
The report recommended that “to ensure the President has options beyond a nuclear-only response to
a catastrophic cyber attack, the DoD must develop a
mix of offensive cyber and high-confidence conventional capabilities.”52 Further, the report recommends
12

a strategy that emphasizes the use of OCO to deter
upper tier cyberthreats and emphasizes defensive
cyberspace operations (DCO) to minimize the impacts
of medium- and lower-tier cyberthreats.53 Finally, the
report offers recommendations and suggested metrics
for progress in the areas of deterrence, intelligence,
world-class OCO and DCO, operational culture, and
cyber resilience.54
Key Issues for Cyberspace Deterrence
How is cyber deterrence viewed in the current dialogue within professional literature? With the growing popularity of the topic, this section cannot present
a comprehensive assessment of the ongoing discourse.
Instead, this section examines representative sources
that offer varying perspectives of key issues for an
emerging national cyber deterrence policy.
One of the most often quoted books in this subject area is Dr. Martin C. Libicki’s 2009 Cyberdeterrence
and Cyberwar, largely because it was one of the first
publications to deal explicitly with deterrence in and
through cyberspace. Written to inform Air Force leaders in the development of their fledgling cyber command, the study focuses on the policies surrounding
conflict in cyberspace and “explores some key aspects
of cyberwar to establish a framework for considering
cyberdeterrence.”55 Libicki coins an interesting definition for cyber deterrence as “deterrence in kind to test
the proposition that the United States, as [former commander USSTRATCOM] General Cartwright offered,
needs to develop a capability in cyberspace to do unto
others what others may want to do unto us.”56 Based
on this perspective, Libicki limits his study to address
mostly the principles of deterrence by punishment.
Like former Director of National Intelligence Clapper,
13

he oversimplifies nuclear deterrence and asserts, “the
ambiguities of cyberdeterrence contrast starkly with
the clarities of nuclear deterrence.”57 While declarations such as “operational cyberwar has an important niche role, but only that” may not stand the test
of time, the analysis framework put forth by Libicki to
explore “why cyberdeterrence is different” continues
to have relevance in this dialogue.58 Finally, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar offers one of the first analyses of
active cyber retaliation and even potential escalation
to cyberwar or general war.
In his Joint Advanced Warfighting School thesis,
“Deterrence in Cyberspace,” Lieutenant Commander
Matthew Rivera seeks to determine the areas of policy
required to enable effective national cyberspace deterrence. He explores the history of nuclear deterrence
and extracts relevant elements from that national
experience to serve as a foundation for a national cyber
deterrence policy. His study yields eight “aspects of
deterrence” to consider: attribution, penalty, credibility, a definition of attack, dependency, counterproductivity, awareness, and futility.59 Rivera then takes these
aspects and explores how they are applied in existing
executive policies and directives as well as those for
the DoD and Department of Homeland Security. He
provides readers with a useful matrix that cross-references the aspects against specific U.S. Government guidance documents in order to identify policy
shortfalls.60 Finally, Rivera uses the eight aspects as a
framework to assess recent cyberspace attacks such
as Stuxnet, Estonia, and Georgia. His recommendations include a call for the United States “to publicly
demonstrate its cyber offensive capability” to convince potential adversaries that U.S. forces “can inflict
significant damage in cyberspace.”61
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In an award-winning essay for Joint Force Quarterly,
Lieutenant Colonel Clorinda Trujillo, U.S. Air Force,
explores “The Limits of Cyberspace Deterrence.” The
author reviews the history of joint deterrence and
notes that successful active deterrence—that is, deterrence by punishment—requires attribution, signaling, and credibility. Based on a review of the policy,
the author lists seven proposed cyberspace deterrence
options that emphasize defensive and passive means
with no explicit mention of retaliation. The use of
offensive cyberspace received only a passing mention,
which is arguably a reduction in significance that does
not match the literature reviewed.62 Trujillo argues
there are several barriers to cyberspace deterrence, to
include difficulty in attack attribution; the first-strike
advantage that cannot be deterred; risk of asymmetric vulnerability to attack in cyberspace; credibility;
and different risk tolerance than actions in the physical domain.63 While presenting recommendations to
improve cyber deterrence, Trujillo ponders if current
efforts to consolidate DoD networks for enhanced
defense also may centralize vulnerabilities for potential attackers—that is, efforts toward defense and resilience actually may be counterproductive.64
In a different Joint Force Quarterly article, “Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence,” Dr. Dorothy
Denning challenges several fundamental aspects as
well as implicit and explicit assumptions regarding
cyber deterrence. Key tenets of the article are the fact
that cyberspace—like the other operational domains—
is a combination of natural (the electromagnetic spectrum for cyberspace) and manufactured structures
and that deterrence focuses on influencing decisions
and actions—the human elements.65 Denning challenges the notion that “it is easier, cheaper, and faster
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to act in cyberspace than in traditional domains,”
arguing that “resources and skillsets matter as much
in cyberspace as any other domain.”66 Denning also
discusses the concept of domain malleability and challenges the perception that cyberspace is more malleable than other domains, pointing out that significant
changes in cyberspace are met with the inertia of standards, legacy software, equipment interoperability,
and transmission protocols.67
Regarding any comparison of cyber deterrence
to nuclear deterrence, Denning asserts “the principles that have made nuclear deterrence effective for
over half a century fall apart in cyberspace.”68 She
supports this position by arguing that nuclear deterrence was weapon-based, dependent on the nature
of the weapon. However, Denning fails to examine
the nuances and numerous manifestations of nuclear
weapons, such as their platforms and delivery systems. In fact, there is no “specific type of weapon”
upon which rests nuclear deterrence. Rather, nuclear
weapons are part of a complex and still evolving force
structure coupled with an equally complex command
and control system, topped off by political and diplomatic discourse at the highest levels of governments—
such a description may also apply to cyberspace.
Therefore, is cyber deterrence domain- or weapon-based? Denning offers insights for both cases, first
examining classes of cyberweapons that can support
defensive and offensive cyberspace actions, and then
identifying several established international regimes
that may enable cyber deterrence.69
Security expert Joseph S. Nye, Jr., examines the relevance of nuclear deterrence lessons in his 2011 Strategic Studies Quarterly article, “Nuclear Lessons for
Cyber Security.” In contrast to Denning, Nye argues
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that while cyber and nukes are different, their development and employment are similar and thus worthy
of thoughtful consideration. He organized the article
into four general lessons and six international cooperation lessons that include technology outpacing policy,
complications due to civilian use, the role of arms
control, and the complexity of deterrence in general.70
His conclusion includes prudent advice for those who
may summarily dismiss the lessons of nuclear deterrence learned during the Cold War, which continue to
be valid:
It may help to put the problems of designing a strategy
for cyber security into perspective, particularly the aspect
of cooperation among states, if we realize how long and
difficult it was to develop a nuclear strategy, much less
international nuclear cooperation.71

In a more recent article in International Security,
“Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,” Nye
considers a broader paradigm of deterrence that
adds entanglement and norms to the classical military-focused means of punishment and denial.72 For
an example of changing norms, Nye observes how
tactical nuclear weapons were considered “normal”
in 1950s Army doctrine, but that over time the norm
has shifted to nonuse—actually, divestment—of these
weapons.73 However, he cautions that norms may be
more difficult with cyberspace, noting, “unlike physical weapons, for example, it would be difficult to
reliably prohibit possession of the whole category of
cyber weapons.”74 Since norms may vary for different nations and cultures, and since deterrence can be
considered a psychological process, Nye advocates
for tailored deterrence, because “a threat or defense
or entanglement or norm that may deter some actors
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may not deter others.”75 For the deterrence of nonstate actors, Nye argues that denial plays a larger role
through the use of law enforcement measures as well
as “robust cyber hygiene and defenses [that] may
divert some nonstate actors to other acts and means.”76
In his conclusion, Nye suggests that escalation ladder
paradigms should be used with caution to avoid
allowing “an opponent to game the outcome and try
tactics just below the next rung.”77 He closed by noting
that the application of deterrence means in cyberspace
requires discretion and prioritization based on their
level of significance to national security. 78
ARMY ROLE IN CYBERSPACE DETERRENCE
What is in the Army’s collective toolkit with regard
to cyberspace deterrence? This section first explores
the Army’s concepts and forces being developed for
cyberspace operations; and then it examines how
these forces may be able to contribute to DoD cyberspace deterrence, as well as to broader DoD deterrence
efforts. It also addresses how the Army may need to
prioritize these contributions based on increasing
levels of conflict escalation. The following discussion
will address Army roles in deterrence at the operational and strategic levels; the tactical level will not be
discussed to avoid the potential of revealing sensitive
tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA)
In February 2013, the Joint Staff published Joint
Publication (JP) 3-12 (R), Cyberspace Operations, to
provide guidance to the joint force for the planning,
execution, and assessment of cyberspace operations.
These operations were divided into three mission
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areas: DCO, OCO, and Department of Defense information network (DODIN) operations. DCO was further divided into operations inside the DODIN as
defensive cyberspace operations-internal defensive
measures (DCO-IDM), and operations external to the
DODIN as defensive cyberspace operations-responsive actions (DCO-RA).79
In April 2017, the Army released Field Manual
(FM) 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations,
as the foundational doctrine to define how the Service
will implement the missions first identified in JP 3-12
(R). As its title indicates, FM 3-12 describes the CEMA
concept as a more holistic approach to cyberspace
operations, as summarized in its foreword:
Incorporating cyberspace electromagnetic activities
(CEMA) throughout all phases of an operation is key
to obtaining and maintaining freedom of maneuver in
cyberspace and the . . . [electromagnetic spectrum] while
denying the same to enemies and adversaries. CEMA
synchronizes capabilities across domains and warfighting
functions and maximizes complementary effects in
and through cyberspace and the . . . [ electromagnetic
spectrum]. Intelligence, signal, information operations . . . ,
cyberspace, space, and fires operations are critical to
planning, synchronizing, and executing cyberspace and
electronic warfare (EW) operations. CEMA optimizes
cyberspace and EW effects when integrated throughout
Army operations.80

The CEMA concept includes five broad sets of
cyberspace actions and three sets of EW actions.
Like the joint DCO mission, some cyberspace and
EW actions take place internal to the DODIN; others
occur external to it. Table 1 lists all these actions and
their locations with respect to the DODIN. For further
details, appendix I of this volume provides the definitions for these actions as well as depicts their relationship with the joint cyberspace missions.
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Cyberspace Actions

Electronic Warfare Actions

Actions Internal to DODIN
•

Cyberspace Defense

•

Cyberspace Security

•

Electronic Protection

Actions External to DODIN
•

Cyberspace Operational Preparation
of the Environment
(OPE)

•

Cyberspace Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance
(ISR)

•

Cyberspace Attack

•

Electronic Attack

Actions Internal and External to DODIN
•

Electronic Warfare
Support

•

Spectrum Management
Operations

Table 1. Army CEMA Operational Actions81
In addition to the CEMA relationship between
cyberspace operations and EW, FM 3-12 includes a
model of electromagnetic spectrum operations, which
is comprised of overlapping activities of EW and
spectrum management operations. These spectrum
management operations activities enable the effective
planning and execution not only of CEMA operations
but also of joint operational use of the electromagnetic
spectrum writ large. The functions of spectrum management operations include policy development, frequency assignment, spectrum management, frequency
interference resolution, and host nation coordination.82
To support unified land operations, FM 3-12 describes
CEMA Working Groups as the conduit to coordinate
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and synchronize CEMA operations between different
levels of command (such as between brigade combat
teams and corps).83 In joint operations, Army units
may request CEMA support of joint cyberspace forces,
such as cyber combat mission teams, using the cyber
effects request format and electronic attack request
format.84
Army Cyberspace Forces
U.S. Army Cyber Command [ARCYBER] directs and
conducts integrated electronic warfare [EW], information
and cyberspace operations as authorized, or directed, to
ensure freedom of action in and through cyberspace and
the information environment, and to deny the same to
our adversaries.85

ARCYBER is the Army’s operational command
for cyberspace operations as well as the service component command to USSTRATCOM for cyberspace.
ARCYBER achieved its full operational capability
in October 2010, and it is currently working to consolidate its headquarters to Fort Gordon, Georgia by
2020.86 Fort Gordon is also the host for the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command’s Cyber Center
of Excellence, which provides training and doctrine
development for the cyber branch.87
ARCYBER forces are organized into four major
units:
• Network Enterprise Technology Command
(NETCOM) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, which
focuses on DODIN operations;88
• 1st Information Operations Command at Fort
Belvoir, Virginia, with a mission that includes
OCO;89
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• Cyber Protection Brigade at Fort Gordon, Georgia, which conducts DCO and supports national
critical infrastructure protection;90 and,
• 780th Military Intelligence Brigade at Fort
Meade, Maryland, which conducts signals intelligence and cyberspace operations.91
The activities of these units are monitored and controlled by the Army Cyber Operations and Integration
Center, an operational unit within ARCYBER headquarters. ARCYBER also maintains a global presence
and situational awareness in cyberspace through five
regional cyber centers assigned to Europe, Southwest Asia, Pacific, Korea, and the continental United
States.92 As of May 2017, the Army cyber force had
2,331 Soldiers of an eventual ARCYBER force size that
is planned to have over 3,800 military and civilian
members with core cyber skills.93
For joint cyberspace operations, ARCYBER is
tasked to provide 41 teams to the USCYBERCOM
cyber mission force (CMF) total of 133 teams. These
teams work in concert to fulfill the USCYBERCOM
mission:
USCYBERCOM
plans,
coordinates,
integrates,
synchronizes and conducts activities to: direct the
operations and defense of specified Department of
Defense information networks [DODIN] and; prepare
to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum military
cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in
all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in
cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries.94

The 41 CMF teams of ARCYBER are broken down by
function as 4 national mission teams, 3 national support teams, 8 cyber combat mission teams, 6 cyber
support teams, and 20 cyber protection teams. Over 80
percent of the ARCYBER teams were mission ready in
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May 2017, and all of the teams are expected to be fully operational by October 2018. Army total force units
also contribute to the CMF mission, with the Army National Guard forming 11 cyber protection teams and
the Army Reserve forming 10 cyber protection teams
by 2021.95 Another significant CMF role of ARCYBER
is the leadership of one of the Joint Force Headquarters
(JFHQ), Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ-C),
which has the responsibility to support cyberspace activities at U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Africa Command.96 Figure 2 depicts
how national mission teams, cyber combat mission
teams, and the cyber protection team elements of the
CMF fit within the overall CEMA operational framework.

Source: U.S. Army.

Figure 2. Army CEMA Operational Framework97
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Army Contributions to DoD Cyber Strategy
Deterrence Efforts
How do Army cyberspace forces contribute to cyberspace deterrence as envisioned in the
response-denial-resilience paradigm of the 2015 DoD
Cyber Strategy? Although FM 3-12 does not address
cyberspace deterrence explicitly, it does discuss how
CEMA operations support response and denial efforts
with regard to adversary cyberspace actions. Also,
while resiliency is not addressed directly, FM 3-12
does mention the need for forces to “adapt quickly and
effectively to enemy and adversary presence inside
cyberspace systems” as well as to “react to incidents,
and then recover and adapt while supporting Army
and joint forces from strategic to tactical levels while
simultaneously denying adversaries effective use of
cyberspace and the . . . [electromagnetic spectrum].”98
Table 2 depicts how Army CEMA efforts best align
with the three cyber strategy deterrence elements.
Since it could be reasonably argued that every CEMA
action can support each of the deterrence means, table
2 was built using each CEMA action only once to infer
the way that it can best serve the collective goal of
cyber deterrence.
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Deterrence Element
(Per 2015
DoD Cyber
Strategy)

(Per 2006
DOJOC)

Joint
Cyberspace
Domain
Missions

Army Operational Contributions
Army CEMA
Operations

Army CMF
Contributions

Response

Impose
Costs

DCO-RA
OCO

Cyberspace Attack
Electronic Attack

4 national mission
teams and 8 cyber
combat mission
teams

Denial

Deny
Benefits

DCO-IDM
DODIN
Operations

Cyberspace
Defense
Cyberspace
Security
Electronic
Protection
Electronic Warfare
Support

41 cyber protection
teams:
20 Active Duty
11 National
Guard
10 Reserve

Resilience

Encourage
Restraint

DCO-IDM
DODIN
Operations

Cyberspace OPE
Cyberspace ISR
Electronic Warfare
Support
Spectrum Management Operations

3 national support
teams and 6 cyber
support teams

Table 2. Army Contribution to
Cyberspace Deterrence
Table 2 also depicts the broader aspect of DoD
deterrence by associating the Army’s various CMF
teams with the three cyberspace mission areas from
JP 3-12 (R) (OCO, DCO, DODIN) as well as the three
deterrence elements from the 2006 DOJOC (impose
costs, deny benefits, and encourage restraint). The
offensive nature of the national mission teams and
cyber combat mission teams was clearly stated in open
Congressional testimony by General Keith Alexander
during his tenure as commander, USCYBERCOM,
who noted: “this is an offensive team that the Defense
Department would use to defend the Nation if it were
attacked in cyber space.”99 In addition, national support teams and cyber support teams are assigned to
provide analytical and planning support to these
mission teams, thus enhancing the resiliency of their
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operations. The bulk of defense operations fall upon
the cyber protection teams that are assigned to protect networks at Service cyberspace component commands, the JFHQ-C, the JFHQ-DODIN, and the Cyber
National Mission Force headquarters.100
Army Contributions to Broader DoD
Deterrence Means
How can Army cyberspace operations contribute
to joint deterrence operations? One way to address
this question is to examine how CEMA activities
can support the direct and enabling means of deterrence described in the 2006 DOJOC. Table 3 summarizes how specific CEMA activities align with specific
deterrence means, with one column that considers
cyberspace activities alone and a second column that
considers additional activities that EW brings to the
CEMA concept.
While these direct and enabling means are common
to many other types of joint operations as well, the
focus here is on the strategic ways of denying benefits, imposing costs, and encouraging restraint of the
adversary. Accordingly, global situational awareness
has a twofold goal: to determine the adversary’s capabilities and to understand their perceptions of benefits
and costs associated with not exercising restraint.101
Active and passive defenses allude to CEMA efforts,
which enable net-centric forces, and they anticipate
the potential use of advanced adversary weapons
with wide area effects, such as electromagnetic pulse
devices.102 For global strike, cyberspace operations are
explicitly mentioned as part of actions employed over
extended distances to meet urgent employment timelines and as “non-kinetic means . . . [that] may supplement US nuclear capabilities.”103
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Enabling Deterrence Means

Direct Deterrence Means

Army Cyberspace Operation Contributions
Deterrence Means

Cyberspace Domain
Operations

Multi-Domain Operations (CEMA)

Force Projection

Cyberspace Attack
Cyberspace OPE
Cyberspace ISR

Electronic Attack: Electromagnetic
Intrusion; Electronic Probing;
and, Electromagnetic Deception.

Active & Passive
Defense

Cyberspace Defense
Cyberspace Security

Electronic Protection: Electromagnetic Hardening; Electronic
Masking; and, Emission Control.
Electronic Attack: Countermeasures;
Electromagnetic Deception; and,
Electromagnetic Jamming.
Electronic Warfare Support:
Electronics Security.

Global Strike

Cyberspace Attack

Electronic Attack: Countermeasures;
Electromagnetic Intrusion; and,
Electromagnetic Pulse.

Strategic
Communications

Cyberspace Defense
Cyberspace Security

Electronic Warfare Support:
Electronics Security.

Global Situational
Awareness

Cyberspace ISR

Electronic Warfare Support:
Electronic Intelligence; and,
Electronic Reconnaissance.

Command &
Control

Cyberspace Defense
Cyberspace Security

Electronic Protection: Electromagnetic Hardening; and, Wartime
Reserve Modes.
Electronic Warfare Support:
Electronics Security.

Forward
Presence

Cyberspace OPE

Electronic Warfare Support:
Electronic Intelligence; and,
Electronic Reconnaissance.
Electronic Attack: Electromagnetic
Intrusion; and, Electronic
Probing.

Security Cooperation & Military
Integration & Interoperability

Cyberspace OPE

Electronic Protection: Electromagnetic Compatibility; and, Electromagnetic Spectrum Management.
Spectrum Management Operations.

Table 3. Army Contributions to Deterrence Means104
In theory, Army CEMA activities can support all
of the deterrence means in table 3, but such support
may not be feasible based on the resources available.
Thus, implementing CEMA actions requires balance
and prioritization not only for immediate tactical and
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operational needs but also for longer-term considerations of strategic deterrence. Also, the allocation
of cyberspace resources must consider the degree to
which specific military assets should be protected. The
2013 DSB report, Resilient Military Systems, cautioned:
Overextending cyber resiliency for all conventional
capability will overwhelm DoD resources (technical,
managerial, and financial). DoD must discipline itself to
identify sufficient protected-conventional capability for
assured operations.105

Army Contributions Across Escalating Levels
of Conflict
Deterrence is dynamic phenomena with the perspectives of decision makers subject to constant
change based on actions and counteractions surrounding a given conflict. The 2006 DoD Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept supports this assertion,
stating that “Tailored deterrence operations continue
throughout the conflict to both deter the crisis (interwar), and shape the adversary’s decision making
process such that they do not take particular actions
during the war (such as WMD [weapons of mass
destruction] use).”106 A more recent assessment is
found in the November 2016 “Mad Scientist Conference” technical report by the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command G2, which notes that the cyber
deterrence environment may involve:
a range of cross- and multi-domain deterrence tools [that]
are emerging that may include sanctions, indictments,
cyber retaliatory options, and even the threat of kinetic
measures in response to cyber provocations.107
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The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy acknowledges the
challenges presented in conflict escalation through its
fourth strategic goal: “Build and maintain viable cyber
options and plan to use those options to control conflict escalation and to shape the conflict environment
at all stages.”108 The implementation of this goal calls
for the integration of cyber options into combatant
command planning, assumedly through support from
JFHQ-C cyber combat mission teams and cyber support teams.109 But how should these planners model
the contribution of cyber forces in varying levels of
conflict escalation?
In his 2011 Strategic Studies Quarterly article,
“Deterrence at the Operational Level of War,” Dr.
James Blackwell examines how U.S. deterrence has
changed since the Cold War. He contrasts the Cold
War rationale actor model with the more contemporary behavioral model that seeks to understand the
values, beliefs, and perspectives that shape adversary
decision making. He also argues that models such as
the Kahn Escalation Ladder that were designed to
model the bipolar nature of the United States and the
former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics relations
might not do well in the current multipolar world. To
address these changes in the deterrence environment,
Blackwell offers “Ten Axioms for Campaign Planners”
that address how to apply deterrence across all phases
of joint operations.110
In contrast to Blackwell, a notional framework of
analysis for active cyber defense application based
on a modified Kahn ladder was proposed in the 2015
Strategic Studies Institute monograph, Army Support of
Cyberspace Operations: Joint Contexts and Global Escalation Implications. In the updated paradigm, the seven
crises regions of the Kahn model are simplified into
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three areas—an upper half of conflict that deals with
existential stakes (win or lose dynamics), a lower half
of conflict that deals with theater or regional conflict
(give and take dynamics), and a strategic warfare
threshold that separates them (see figure 3 for a diagram of the modified Kahn ladder). Figure 4 depicts
a possible progression of events across increasing
intensity of conflict and degree of escalation with the
strategic threshold characterized by cyberattacks on
national critical infrastructure.111

Figure 3. Modified Kahn Escalation Ladder112
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Figure 4. Dynamics of Conflict and Escalation113
How should Army cyber forces support the activities depicted in figure 4? As escalation increases the
stakes involved with the conflict, the operational focus
of Army cyberspace activity should adapt to best serve
the strategic interests of the Nation. Table 4 provides
an initial look at how the focus of Army support might
change with conflict escalation; it is not presented as
a solution, rather it is offered as a starting point for
further dialogue. It proposes that the cyber deterrence
priorities will be Response in the upper half of conflict, Denial in the threshold area, and Resilience in
the lower half of conflict. Further development of this
paradigm by cyber professionals should also consider
the guiding principles of the 2017 DSB report on cyber
deterrence, which include “deterrence by cost imposition requires credible response options at varying
levels of conflict.”114

31

Escalation
Ladders Area

Focus of Army Cyberspace
Activity
Deterrence Priority: Response

Upper Half
(Existential
Conflict)

•

Cyberspace attack integrated with conventional and
nuclear strike

•

Cyberspace defense and cyberspace security dedicated to nuclear and segmented conventional strike
command and control

•

Cyberspace defense and cyberspace security
reduced for some fielded forces to provide resources
for priority response activities
Deterrence Priority: Denial

Strategic Warfare
Threshold

•

Cyberspace defense and cyberspace security emphasize protection of national critical infrastructure

•

Cyberspace ISR and cyberspace OPE support the
planning and application of DCO-RA measures
Deterrence Priority: Resilience

Lower Half
(Theater/
Regional
Conflict)

•

Cyberspace ISR and cyberspace OPE emphasize
enabling specific joint operating area or theater of
operations

•

Cyberspace defense and cyberspace security emphasize protecting fielded joint forces

Table 4. Army Cyberspace Support in Simplified
Escalation Ladder Areas
This section shows that the Army cyber forces
can make significant contributions to U.S. cyberspace
deterrence efforts as well as to broader U.S. strategic
deterrence ventures. One of the greatest challenges
facing Army leaders is how to balance and prioritize
the almost unlimited demands of fulfilling military
cyberspace missions with limited resources.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The concept of cyberspace deterrence is still in its
infancy, and it is fraught with controversy regarding
how to best proceed. This study has identified several
key issues that should be included in the continued
development and practice of cyberspace deterrence
activities. This section offers suggestions to support
the refinement of Army and DoD support to this
endeavor.
Recommendation 1
The DoD and the Army should consider applications and implications of strategic OCO in synergy
with the application of conventional and nuclear
global strike.
This recommendation should build upon earlier
recommendations from the 2013 DSB study on resilient military systems (determine a mix of cyber, conventional, and nuclear capabilities115) as well as the
2017 DSB study on cyber deterrence (boost the cyber
resilience of key U.S. strike systems116). Also, integrating these capabilities is consistent with the 2006
DOJOC tenet to integrate nuclear and non-nuclear
strike operations in order to provide increased flexibility and credibility of U.S. deterrence writ large, which
in turn reduces the likelihood of nuclear weapons
use.117 With this model in mind, perhaps the mission
statement of USCYBERCOM should be modified to
add: “Provide direct support of U.S. strategic deterrence operations to include the protection of nuclear
operations.” Certainly, one can reasonably argue
that this content is contained implicitly in the current USCYBERCOM mission statement. However,
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since deterrence depends on perceptions and signaling, creating the explicit connection of military cyberspace operations to existential deterrence operations
can only clarify the relationship and thus strengthen
deterrence credibility.118
Recommendation 2
The Army Cyber Center of Excellence and
ARCYBER should explicitly address how CEMA
supports cyberspace-domain and multi-domain
deterrence operations in the next iteration of FM
3-12.
The preface of the current FM 3-12 notes that the
document not only addresses tactics and procedures
for unified land operations and joint operations, but
also “provides overarching guidance to commanders
and staffs on Army cyberspace and electronic warfare [EW] operations at all echelons.” Its intended
audience is “all members of the profession of arms”
which includes joint and international forces as well
as trainers and educators.119 Some CEMA actions, such
as OCO, should be pursued with full knowledge of
the broader context of ongoing cyber deterrence and
national deterrence efforts—yet, FM 3-12 is deficient of
this context. To properly inform the intended FM 3-12
audience, a distinct and concise discussion of cyber
deterrence should be added to the next iteration of FM
3-12. This enhancement to Army doctrine would also
support the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy strategic goal task
to “Assess DoD’s cyber deterrence posture and strategy.”120 Also, a more informed body of professionals with respect to Army contributions to cyberspace
deterrence can help USSTRATCOM and USCYBERCOM in their efforts to “determine whether DoD is
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building the capabilities required for attributing and
deterring key threats from conducting such [cyber]
attacks and recommend specific actions that DoD can
take to improve its cyber deterrence posture.”121
Recommendation 3
ARCYBER JFHQ-C should deliberately develop
and conduct regionally-based cyberspace deterrence
planning and operations.
ARCYBER JFHQ-C is responsible for providing
and coordinating CMF teams that support U.S. Central
Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Northern
Command. The cyber combat mission teams and cyber
support teams should advise their respective combatant command staffs in the planning of theater cyberspace operations that consider the holistic deterrence
context of the region. This recommendation extends
the discussion and findings of the 2017 DSB report on
cyber deterrence in the area of “plan and conduct tailored deterrence campaigns” to go beyond the current
potential adversary list (Russia, China, Iran, North
Korea, and the Islamic State of Iraq).122 Of course, this
recommendation also applies to the JFHQ-C support
to all combatant commands.
Recommendation 4
The Army should continue to refine its CEMA
construct to provide a more holistic approach to
cyberspace operations.
Some of the confusion and controversy surrounding cyberspace deterrence may be a reflection of ill-defined notions with regard to what activities comprise
cyberspace operations. The Army CEMA paradigm
appears to offer planners an effective way of merging
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cyberspace operations with those of EW and electromagnetic spectrum operations. ARCYBER and the
Cyber Center of Excellence should ensure that they
are not only adapting the CEMA concept to capture
improvements derived from operational experience
(Army and joint), but that they are also developing
relevant foundational theory.
Recommendation 5
The Army should support the DoD in the
development of a comprehensive cyber deterrence
strategy.
As promulgated in the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy, the
U.S. Government needs a comprehensive cyber deterrence strategy that deliberately integrates the elements
of national power: diplomatic, informational, military,
economic, financial, intelligence, and legal.123 ARCYBER should support USCYBERCOM in developing
and maintaining such a strategy, as well as adapt
ARCYBER operations to best support the tenets of the
comprehensive strategy when it is available. ARCYBER should also work with the Army foreign area
officer branch to educate their officers in cyberspace
operations so that foreign area officers can help enable
strategic cyberspace deterrence efforts in the countries
where they are posted.
Recommendation 6
The Army and the DoD should include the foundations of U.S. nuclear weapon employment and
related strategic deterrence concepts at all levels of
professional military education.
Some of the skepticism over the applicability of
“classic nuclear deterrence theory” to cyberspace
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deterrence may be due to widespread ignorance of
nuclear operations. In his January 2017 Senate testimony, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper implied that nuclear deterrence theory is well
understood and can be even be sensed tactilely, while
cyberspace is “ephemeral.” Accordingly, he asserted,
“We currently cannot put a lot of stock, at least in my
mind, in cyber deterrence.”124 But who is the “we” in
his statements? Do Director Clapper and other U.S.
senior leaders really claim to understand the tactical and operational mechanisms of nuclear weapon
employment as well as their immediate and long-term
global effects? Certainly, if current joint doctrine and
professional military education is an indicator, then
the answer is “no.” In fact, as critical thinkers, military
professionals should consider the possibility that no
one has truly understood nuclear deterrence.
Further, the Cold War success at avoiding a global
catastrophe may have been a happy accident of history that has given the world a false sense of security
regarding still-existing stockpiles that could devastate
the world. In fact, one could argue that nuclear weapons systems and operations, in general, have been
purposefully simplified by some leaders and analysts
in order to enable self-delusion of understanding and
claiming the “success of deterrence.” Given the stakes
for failure, perhaps deterrence theory that addresses
the existential realm of conflict should be given more
time in doctrine and professional military education.
This would set the proper foundation and context
for the understanding of interlinked concepts such
as cyberspace deterrence. In other words, one should
first study nuclear deterrence more thoroughly to seek
its proper relationship to newer concepts of deterrence
before throwing it out as not applicable to cyberspace.
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Recommendation 7
The Army and the DoD should consider the
development of a cyber triad deterrence concept.
The 2003 Nuclear Posture Review proposed a
“New Triad” for nuclear deterrence forces that consisted of non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities,
defenses, and responsive infrastructure. While the
“New Triad” was phased out in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the paradigm may be useful for modeling
cyberspace deterrence. The similar Cyber Triad would
have OCO, DCO, and responsive network infrastructure as its three legs.125 These three legs correlate well
to the three primary cyberspace missions of JP 3-12
(R), and the Cyber Triad paradigm would focus on
how to balance the mixture of forces to address a specific threat or situation.
CLOSING THOUGHTS
The U.S. tradition of pursuing national-level deterrence has developed and evolved significantly since
the introduction of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Since
the United States has publicly stated that it has vital
interests in cyberspace, it is prudent for the Nation to
achieve deterrence in this relatively new realm. This
monograph examined the implications for the Army
to support such an endeavor. It considered the existing policy and strategy documents written at the
departmental and executive level as well as the international commitments and implications that they may
embody. It also explored the concepts of deterrence in
cyberspace in the context of traditional deterrence utilizing all forms of national power as well as aspects
potentially unique to cyberspace.
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Mechanisms
of
deterrence—military
and
national—exist whether we are aware of them or not.
Without proper coordination, deterrence measures
may escalate the conflict to levels undesired by either
party. If military professionals do not seek to study
these mechanisms, then the Nation’s military cyberspace operations may be conducted by those who are
unenlightened as to the broader context and larger
stakes of tactical- and operational-level exchanges. It
is confusing enough to deal with leaders who chose
to think that deterrence is dead, perhaps limiting their
analysis to a nostalgic Cold War nuclear perspective.
Adding cyberspace to the deterrence mix certainly
makes matters more complex, but that is why the
issue should not be ignored out of frustration; rather,
it should be embraced out of sage consideration for
the future.
ENDNOTES

1. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 2018, p. 69, available from
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.
pdf?ver=2018-09-06-102155-910, accessed November 2, 2018.
2. “Stenographic Transcript Before the Committee on Armed
Services, United States Senate, Hearing To Receive Testimony on
Foreign Cyber Threats to the United States,” 115th Congress, Sess.
1, January 5, 2017, p. 5, available from http://armed-services.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/17-01_01-05-17.pdf, accessed October 2, 2017,
hereafter, “Stenographic Transcript, Foreign Cyber Threats,” January 5, 2017.
3. Ibid., p. 6.
4. Ibid., p. 16.
5. Ibid., pp. 24, 43. The context surrounding Director of
National Intelligence Clapper’s comments on cyber deterrence
was:

39

Unlike nuclear weapons, cyber capabilities are difficult to
see and evaluate and are ephemeral. It is accordingly very
hard to create the substance and psychology of deterrence in
my view.” (p. 24)
The point I was trying to make is that in the case of nuclear
deterrence, there are instruments you can see, feel, touch,
measure, weaponry. We have had a demonstration a long
time ago of the impact of nuclear weaponry. And that is
what creates both the physical substance of deterrence, as
well as the psychology. And the problem with the cyber
domain—it does not have those physical dimensions that
you can measure, see, feel, and touch as we do with nuclear
deterrence. (p. 43)

6. Ibid., pp. 104-105. The context of Admiral Rogers’ comments on the role of defense in cyber deterrence includes:
So as we [Senate Armed Services Committee hearing
attendees] talked about more broadly today, we have got to
get better on the defensive side because part of deterrence is
making it harder for them to succeed. I acknowledge that.
But a defensive strategy alone is not going to work. It is a
resource-intensive approach to doing business, and it puts
us on the wrong end of the cost equation. That is a losing
strategy for us, but it is a component of a strategy. (p. 104)

7. Untitled White House report on U.S. cyber deterrence
policy, accessed through article link from Scott Maucione, “White
House finally acquiesces to Congress on cyber deterrence policy,”
Federal News Radio, December 29, 2015, available from https://
federalnewsradio.com/cybersecurity/2015/12/white-house-finallyacquiesces-congress-cyber-deterrence-policy/, accessed October 13,
2017.
8. Lisa O. Monaco, “Administration Efforts on Cybersecurity:
The Year in Review and Looking Forward to 2016,” White House
Blog, February 2, 2016, available from https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/blog/2016/02/02/administration-efforts-cybersecurityyear-review-and-looking-forward-2016, accessed October 13, 2017.
9. Untitled White House report on U.S. cyber deterrence
policy, p. 1.

40

10. Andrew Blake, “John McCain says White House’s cyber
deterrence policy comes up short,” The Washington Times, January 15, 2016, available from https://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2016/jan/15/john-mccain-says-white-houses-cyber-deterrencepol/, accessed October 13, 2017.
11. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington,
DC: The White House, February 2015.
12. Barack Obama, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, Washington,
DC: The White House, May 2011.
13. Ibid., p. 14.
14. Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy,
Washington, DC: Department of State, March 2016, pp. 1, 20-23,
available from http://state.gov/documents/organization/255732.pdf,
accessed September 30, 2017.
15. Ibid., pp. 20-23. The strategy endeavors to provide options
for the President:
The President has at his disposal a number of tools to
carry out deterrence by denial. These include a range of
policies, regulations, and voluntary standards aimed at
increasing the security and resiliency of U.S. government
and private sector computer systems. They also include
incident response capabilities and certain law enforcement
authorities, such as those used by the Department of
Justice to take down criminal botnets. They include cyber
threat information sharing mechanisms, as well as publicprivate partnerships. International cooperation is also a
key element of the United States’ strategy to respond to
and prevent cyber incidents. The Department of Homeland
Security’s National Cybersecurity and Communications
Integration Center . . . and law enforcement agencies
frequently engage foreign counterparts to share information
and coordinate operational assistance in responding to and
mitigating malicious activities taking place from abroad. The
Department of State can use its diplomatic channels, where
appropriate, to bring a whole-of-government response to
particular cyber incidents, and promote cooperation among
policy makers in addressing these incidents. (pp. 20-21)

41

16. “Stenographic Transcript Before the Committee on Armed
Services, United States Senate, Hearing to Receive Testimony on
United States Strategic Command Programs,” 115th Congress,
Sess. 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April
4, 2017, p. 9, available from http://armed-services.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/17-31_04-04-17.pdf, accessed October 11, 2017.
17. Ibid., p. 40. General Hyten went on to note:
So I see a top tier cyber threat being Russia and China in
particular because they have the ability to threaten the
existence of this Nation. And so one of the reasons you
have to be able to protect the nuclear command and control
capability is that is fundamental to deterrence. If that is ever
brought into question, that lowers our deterrent posture to
top tier threats, and we have to make sure we never allow
that to happen. (p. 47)

18. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2015: The United States Military’s
Contribution To National Security, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of
Staff, June 2015, p. 11. The strategy described nuclear deterrent
efforts as:
Maintain a Secure and Effective Nuclear Deterrent. U.S.
strategic forces are kept at the highest state of readiness,
always prepared to respond to threats to the homeland and
our vital interests. Accordingly, we are investing to sustain
and modernize our nuclear enterprise. We continue to
implement the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and 2011 New
START Treaty while ensuring our national defense needs
are met. Concurrently, we are enhancing our command and
control capabilities for strategic and regional nuclear forces.
(p. 10)

19. Department of Defense (DoD), Quadrennial Defense Review
2014, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March
4, 2014, p. 13.
20. Ibid., pp. 20, 32. Space systems and missile defense ties to
deterrence are found in the following passages:
U.S. global communications and military operations depend
on freedom of access in space, making security in this domain

42

vital to our ability to project power and win decisively
in conflict. The Department will pursue a multi-layered
approach to deter attacks on space systems while retaining
the ability to respond, should deterrence fail. (p. 20)
Allied and partner acquisition of interoperable ballistic
missile defense capabilities and participation in regional
deterrence and defense architectures will counter the
coercive and operational value of adversary ballistic missile
systems as well. (p. 32)

21. Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version
2.0, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2006,
available from http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/
concepts/joc_deterrence.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162015-337,
accessed
September 27, 2017, hereafter, DOJOC.
22. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February
13, 2006, pp. II-4–II-5. Computer Network Operations (CNO) was
one of the five core functions of joint information operations; the
other four were psychological operations, military deception,
operations security, and electronic warfare (EW).
CNO is one of the latest capabilities developed in support
of military operations. CNO stems from the increasing use
of networked computers and supporting . . . [information
technology] infrastructure systems by military and civilian
organizations. CNO, along with EW, is used to attack, deceive,
degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend electronic
information and infrastructure. For the purpose of military
operations, CNO are divided into . . . [computer network
attack, computer network defense], and related computer
network exploitation . . . enabling operations. [Computer
network attack] . . . consists of actions taken through the use
of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy
information resident in computers and computer networks,
or the computers and networks themselves. [Computer
network defense] . . . involves actions taken through the
use of computer networks to protect, monitor, analyze,
detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DOD
information systems and computer networks. [Computer
network defense] . . . actions not only protect DOD systems
from an external adversary but also from exploitation from

43

within, and are now a necessary function in all military
operations. [Computer network exploitation] . . . is enabling
operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted
through the use of computer networks to gather data
from target or adversary automated information systems
or networks. Note that due to the continued expansion of
wireless networking and the integration of computers and
radio frequency communications, there will be operations
and capabilities that blur the line between CNO and EW and
that may require case-by-case determination when EW and
CNO are assigned separate release authorities.

The current version of JP 3-13 was released on November 27, 2012,
and updated with change 1 on November 20, 2014; it purposefully
removed the lexicon related to CNO.
23. DOJOC, p. 23.
24. Ibid., pp. 24-28.
25. Ibid., pp. 6, 28-44, 52-54.
26. Ibid., pp. 44-52.
27. Ibid., p. 15. The concept anticipates that commercially
available capabilities will significantly increase the challenges to
U.S. forces:
The proliferation of commercial dual-use technology,
including the addition of satellite-assisted precision-guided
weapons, will make this adaptation more feasible for a wider
variety of potential adversaries. Additionally, commercially
available information and cyber services (many enabled
through common space systems) will provide an element of
global reach for actors once limited to exerting only regional
influence. The emergence of advanced capabilities and
technologies such as computer network attack or directed
energy weapons may permit future adversaries to achieve
objectives once attainable only via the use of WMD [weapons
of mass destruction].

28. Ibid., p. 39.
29. Ibid., pp. 62-64. Deterrence actions recommended in
an example include: “Conduct CYBERSPACE WARFARE to

44

sabotage [e.g., discredit financial data] systems associated with
Adversary X’s WMD acquisition activities and undermine their
support relationships with other third-party actors. (denying benefits).” (p. 64)
30. Ibid., p. 76.
31. Ibid., p. 41.
32. The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, April 2015.
33. Ibid., pp. 25-26.
34. Ibid., p. 10.
35. Ibid., pp. 26-28.
36. Ibid., p. 12.
37. Ibid., p. 10. The call for a comprehensive cyber deterrence
strategy is summarized as:
In the face of an escalating threat, the Department of
Defense [DoD] must contribute to the development and
implementation of a comprehensive cyber deterrence
strategy to deter key state and non-state actors from
conducting cyberattacks against U.S. interests. Because of
the variety and number of state and non-state cyber actors in
cyberspace and the relative availability of destructive cyber
tools, an effective deterrence strategy requires a range of
policies and capabilities to affect a state or non-state actors’
behavior.

38. See the cover letter, “SUBJECT: Final Report of the
Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Cyber Deterrence,”
signed James N. Miller and James R. Gosler, to the DSB, Task Force
on Cyber Deterrence, Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, February
2017, available from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1028516.
pdf, accessed September 26, 2017.
39. DSB, Task Force on Cyber Deterrence, p. 3.

45

40. Ibid. The DSB report defines the two major types of cyber
threats as:
Cyber Attack. For the purposes of this report, a cyber attack
is any deliberate action that affects the desired availability
and/or integrity of data or information systems integral to
operational outcomes of a given organization. Not all cyber
intrusions constitute attacks; indeed the vast majority do not.
Cyber attacks may have temporary or permanent effects;
they may be destructive of equipment or only disruptive of
services; and they may be conducted remotely or by close
access (including by insiders). In addition, while there is
considerable attention given to cyber attacks focused on data
and software-in-operation, supply chain vulnerabilities are
of growing concern in a world where critical infrastructure
is built and sustained through a global supply chain subject
to malicious alteration across various phases of system life
cycles [emphasis in original]. (pp. 2-3)
Costly Cyber Intrusions. Under our definitions, China’s
massive cyber theft of U.S. intellectual property and
Russia’s hack of U.S. political parties to facilitate information
operations undermining confidence in U.S. elections
represent costly cyber intrusions. The cyber intrusions in
these cases did not affect the availability and/or integrity of
U.S. data or information systems, and so do not constitute
cyber attacks, but these intrusions did facilitate unacceptable
actions by China and Russia that imposed respectively
economic and political costs on the United States [emphasis
in original]. (p. 3)

are:

41. Ibid., pp. 6-8. The eight guiding principles of the report
The U.S. cyber deterrence posture must include both
deterrence by denial and deterrence by cost imposition, with
a different balance depending on the perpetrator and the
severity of the attack to be deterred.
Deterrence by cost imposition requires understanding what
key adversary decision makers value, holding that which
they value at risk, and communicating (explicitly and/
or implicitly by precedential action) the credible will and
capability to respond.

46

Deterrence by cost imposition requires credible response
options at varying levels of conflict.
In the event of a cyber attack on the United States (i.e., a
failure of cyber deterrence), the question should not be
whether to impose costs in response, but how and when to
do so against the attacker, and how to connect the response
to the attack.
The United States must clarify, first internally and then to
potential adversaries, that it seeks to deter and will aim to
impose countervailing costs in response to some forms of
costly cyber intrusions.
Responding to adversary cyber attacks and costly cyber
intrusions carries a risk of escalation (and quite possibly
intelligence loss), but not responding carries near-certainty
of suffering otherwise deterrable attacks in the future.
Reducing the vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructure is
essential not only to deterrence by denial, it also reinforces
the credibility of U.S. threats to impose costs on attackers.
Although it may appear desirable in theory to find effective
arms control approaches to stabilize the cyber balance
between major powers—U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China—in
practice cyber arms control is not viable, though norms and
rules of the road may be both viable and highly valuable.

42. Ibid., pp. 9-16.
43. Ibid., p. 18.
44. Ibid., p. 21.
45. Ibid., pp. 25-28.
46. Ibid., p. 28.
47. See the DSB report, co-chaired by James R. Gosler and
Lewis Von Thaer, DSB, Task Force Report: Resilient Military Systems
and the Advanced Cyber Threat, Washington, DC: Defense Science
Board, Department of Defense, January 2013, p. ii, available from
https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/ResilientMilitarySystemsC
yberThreat.pdf, accessed September 28, 2017.

47

48. Ibid., p. 31.
49. Ibid., pp. 6, 15. The report asserts that cyberattacks may
constitute an existential threat:
The DoD should expect cyber to be part of all future conflicts,
especially against near-peer and peer adversaries. This Task
Force believes that full manifestation of the cyber threat
could even produce existential consequences to the United
States, particularly with respect to critical infrastructure. (p.
15)

50. Ibid., p. 31.
51. Ibid., p. 7.
52. Ibid., p. 8. The proposed response options available to the
President would include:
Cyber offense may provide the means to respond in-kind.
The protected conventional capability should provide
credible and observable kinetic effects globally. Forces
supporting this capability are isolated and segmented from
general purpose forces to maintain the highest level of cyber
resiliency at an affordable cost. Nuclear weapons would
remain the ultimate response and anchor the deterrence
ladder. This strategy builds a real ladder of capabilities and
alleviates the need to protect all of our systems to the highest
level requirements, which is unaffordable for the nation.
Similar to the prior argument regarding the cyber resiliency
of the nuclear deterrent, DoD must ensure that some portion
of its conventional capability is able to provide assured
operations for theater and regional operations within a fullspectrum, cyber-stressed environment.

53. Ibid., p. 32.
54. Ibid., p. 33. The seven report recommendations are:
1.

Protect the Nuclear Strike as a Deterrent (for existing
nuclear armed states and existential cyber attack).

2.

Determine the Mix of Cyber, Protected-Conventional,
and Nuclear Capabilities Necessary for Assured
Operation in the Face of a Full-Spectrum Adversary.

48

3.

Refocus Intelligence Collection and Analysis to
Understand Adversarial Cyber Capabilities, Plans and
Intentions, and to Enable Counterstrategies.

4.

Build and Maintain World-Class Cyber Offensive
Capabilities (with appropriate authorities).

5.

Enhance Defenses to Protect Against Low and Mid-Tier
Threats.

6.

Change DoD’s Culture Regarding Cyber and Cyber
Security.

7.

Build a Cyber Resilient Force.

55. Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar, Santa
Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2009, p. 5. For a review
of this book, see Jeffrey L. Caton, “Book Reviews: Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 1,
Spring 2011, pp. 148-150, available from https://www.airuniversity.
af.mil/SSQ/Display/Article/1063480/volume-05-issue-1-spring-2011/,
accessed October 13, 2017.
56. Libicki, p. 27.
57. Ibid., p. xvi.
58. Ibid., p. 39. The nine questions that Libicki explored to
“differentiate cyberdeterrence from nuclear deterrence or general
military deterrence” are:
[Critical questions:]
• Do we know who did it [attacked us]?
• Can we hold their assets at risk?
• Can we do so repeatedly?

[Ancillary questions:]
•
•
•
•
•
•

If retaliation does not deter, can it at least disarm?
Will third parties join the fight?
Does retaliation send the right message to our own side?
Do we have a threshold for response?
Can we avoid escalation?
What if the attacker has little worth hitting?

49

59. Matthew Rivera, “Deterrence in Cyberspace,” Master
of Science thesis, Hampton, VA: Joint Advanced Warfighting
School, Joint Forces Staff College, June 2012, pp. 1, 6-14, available
from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a562428.pdf, accessed
December 7, 2018.
60. Ibid., pp. 61-62.
61. Ibid., p. 56.
62. Clorinda Trujillo, “The Limits of Cyberspace Deterrence,”
Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 75, 4th Qtr., 2014, pp. 43-52, available
from
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-75/jfq75_43-52_Trujillo.pdf, accessed August 21, 2017. This essay won
the Strategic Research Paper category of the 2014 Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition. The author summarizes their review of existing policy as:
Based on this existing policy and doctrine and additional
scholarly efforts, proposed cyberspace deterrent options
include:
• develop policy and legal procedures
• develop other credible response options
[which include offensive cyberspace actions]
• pursue partnerships
• secure cyberspace
• enhance resiliency
• strengthen defense
• conduct cyberspace deception. (p. 47)

63. Ibid., pp. 47-49.
64. Ibid., p. 49.
65. Dorothy E. Denning, “Rethinking the Cyber Domain and
Deterrence,” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 77, 2nd Qtr., 2015, pp. 8-15,
available from http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/
jfq-77/jfq-77_8-15_Denning.pdf, accessed September 28, 2017.
66. Ibid., p. 10.
67. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
68. Ibid., p. 11.

50

69. Ibid., pp. 12-15.
70. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security?”
Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 2011, pp. 18-35.
The lessons put forth by Nye can be summarized as:
Some General Lessons. . . . Expect continuing technological
change to complicate early efforts at strategy. . . . Strategy
for a new technology will lack adequate empirical content.
. . . New technologies raise new issues in civil-military
relations. . . . Civilian uses will complicate effective
national security strategies [emphasis in original]. (pp.
23-27)
International Cooperation Lessons. . . . Learning can lead
to concurrence in beliefs without cooperation. . . . Learning
is often lumpy and discontinuous. . . . Learning occurs
at different rates in different issues of a new domain.
. . . Deterrence is complex and involves more than just
retaliation. . . . Begin arms control with positive-sum games
related to third parties [emphasis in original]. (pp. 29-34)

71. Ibid., p. 36.
72. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 3, Winter 2016/17, pp.
44–71. Nye defines entanglement as “the existence of various
interdependences that make a successful attack simultaneously
impose serious costs on the attacker as well as the victim.” (p. 58)
73. Ibid., p. 60.
74. Ibid., p. 61.
75. Ibid., p. 63. Although it may not be a recognized norm,
Nye notes that “cyberattacks may be used for political signaling
as well as physical destruction and disruption.” (p. 49)
76. Ibid., pp. 67-68. Note that Nye considers resilience to be a
part of denial. (p. 56)
77. Ibid., p. 70.

51

78. Ibid., p. 71. Nye closes the article with practical advice for
cyber deterrence planners:
Not all cyberattacks are of equal importance; not all can be
deterred; and not all rise to the level of significant national
security threats. The lesson for policymakers is to focus on
the most important attacks and to understand the full range
of mechanisms and contexts in which they can be prevented.

79. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-12 (R), Cyberspace Operations,
Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, original release February
5, 2013, updated as unclassified public document on October 21,
2014. Key definitions of joint cyberspace missions are:
defensive cyberspace operations [DCO]. Passive and active
cyberspace operations intended to preserve the ability to
utilize friendly cyberspace capabilities and protect data,
networks, net-centric capabilities, and other designated
systems [emphasis in original]. (p. GL-4)
[Defensive Cyberspace Operations] Internal Defensive
Measures [DCO-IDM]. Internal defensive measures
are those DCO that are conducted within the DODIN
[Department of Defense information network]. They include
actively hunting for advanced internal threats as well as
the internal responses to these threats. Internal defensive
measures respond to unauthorized activity or alerts/threat
information within the DODIN, and leverage intelligence,
. . . [counterintelligence, law enforcement], . . . and other
military capabilities as required [emphasis in original]. (p.
II-3)
defensive cyberspace operation response action [DCORA]. Deliberate, authorized defensive measures or activities
taken outside of the defended network to protect and defend
Department of Defense [DoD] cyberspace capabilities or
other designated systems [emphasis in original]. (p. GL-4)
Department of Defense information network [DODIN]
operations. Operations to design, build, configure, secure,
operate, maintain, and sustain Department of Defense [DoD]
networks to create and preserve information assurance on
the Department of Defense information networks [emphasis
in original]. (p. GL-4)

52

offensive cyberspace operations [OCO]. Cyberspace
operations intended to project power by the application of
force in or through cyberspace [emphasis in original]. (p.
GL-4)

80. See John B. Morrison, Jr., “Foreword,” in Field Manual
(FM) 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of Army, April 11, 2017,
available from https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/
web/ARN3089_FM%203-12%20FINAL%20WEB%201.pdf, accessed
August 8, 2017, hereafter, FM 3-12.
81. FM 3-12, pp. 1-9–1-10, 1-25–1-31.
82. Ibid., pp. 1-25, 1-34–1-35.
83. Ibid., pp. 3-10–3-13.
84. Ibid., pp. C-1–D-2. FM 3-12 appendix C provides an example of the cyber effects request format and appendix D provides
an example of the electronic attack request format.
85. See the mission statement in “U.S. Army Cyber Command: The Nation’s Army in Cyberspace,” trifold, Fort Gordon,
GA: U.S. Army Cyber Command, February 8, 2018, available
from http://www.arcyber.army.mil/Info/Fact-Sheets/Fact-Sheet-ViewPage/Article/1435502/us-army-cyber-command/, accessed August 23,
2018.
86. U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), “Groundbreaking marks ‘leap forward’ for Army cyberspace operations,”
U.S. Army, December 1, 2016, available from https://www.army.
mil/article/178917/groundbreaking_marks_leap_forward_for_army_
cyberspace_operations, accessed August 30, 2017. ARCYBER headquarters is currently split-based at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, Fort
Meade, Maryland, and Fort Gordon, Georgia.
87. “Statement by Lieutenant General Edward C. Cardon,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Cyber Command and
Second Army before the House Armed Services Committee,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Operationalizing Cyberspace for the Services,” 1st Sess., 114th Congress, March 4, 2015, p. 2, available from https://docs.house.gov/

53

meetings/AS/AS26/20150304/103093/HHRG-114-AS26-Wstate-CardonE-20150304.pdf, accessed September 13, 2017.
88. See more information at the official website, NETCOM.
Army.Mil: U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command, available from http://netcom.army.mil/, accessed August 22,
2017.
89. “Our Mission,” 1st Information Operations Command,
n.d., available from http://www.1stiocmd.army.mil/Home/Mission,
accessed September 4, 2017.
90. Benjamin Leitzel and Anthony Allard, eds., Strategic
Cyberspace Operations Guide, Carlisle, PA: Center for Strategic
Leadership, U.S. Army War College, June 1, 2016, p. 120, available
from https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/usacsl/Publications/StrategicCybe
rspaceOperationsGuide2016.pdf, accessed September 2, 2017.
91. “Welcome: Mission,” 780th Military Intelligence Brigade,
available from https://www.inscom.army.mil/msc/780mib/, accessed
September 4, 2017.
92. FM 3-12, p. 3-3. ARCYBER RCCs are described as:
The regional cyber center is the single point of contact for
operational status, service provisioning, incident response,
and all Army network services in its assigned theater. It
coordinates directly with tactical units to provide DODIN-A
services, support to DODIN operations, and when required
DCO to enable mission command and the warfighting
functions.

93. “Statement by LTG Paul M. Nakasone, Commanding General, U.S. Army Cyber Command before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Army Cyber Posture,” U.S. Senate, 1st Sess., 115th Congress,
May 23, 2017, pp. 2, 12, available from https://www.armedservices.senate.gov/download/?id=A19E0B4E-9DA3-4A42-8DFDCED899D34851&download=1, accessed August 15, 2017.
94. See the fact sheet, “U.S. Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM),” Official website of U.S. Strategic Command, September 30, 2016, available from https://web.archive.
org/web/20170925100958/http://www.stratcom.mil/media/factsheets/

54

factsheet-view/article/960492/us-cyber-command-uscybercom/,
accessed August 23, 2018.
95. “Statement by LTG Paul M. Nakasone,” pp. 2, 7.
96. “All Cyber Mission Force Teams Achieve Initial Operating Capability,” news release, Fort Meade, MD: U.S. Cyber
Command, October 24, 2016, available from https://dod.defense.
gov/News/Article/Article/984663/all-cyber-mission-force-teamsachieve-initial-operating-capability/, accessed August 22, 2017. The
responsibilities of the other three Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber
(JFHQ-C) are divided amongst the other cyber Service component
commands as follows: JFHQ-C Marine Forces Cyberspace Command: U.S. Special Operations Command; JFHQ-C Fleet Cyber
Command: U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command;
and JFHQ-C Air Forces Cyber: U.S. European Command, U.S.
Strategic Command, and U.S. Transportation Command.
97. Image modified from FM 3-12, p. vi.
98. FM 3-12, pp. 1-2, 1-5.
99. “Hearing to Receive Testimony On U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Cyber Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2014 and the Future Years Defense
Program,” U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 113th Congress, Sess. 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
March 12, 2013, pp. 8-9, available from https://armed-services.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/13-09%20-%203-12-13.pdf, accessed October 8,
2017. With regard to the offensive stance of some cyber combat
mission teams, General Alexander stressed:
I would like to be clear that this team, this defend the Nation
team, is not a defensive team; this is an offensive team that
the Defense Department would use to defend the Nation if
it were attacked in cyber space. 13 of the teams that we are
creating are for that mission set alone. We’re also creating 27
teams that would support combatant commands and their
planning process for offensive cyber capabilities. Then we
have a series of teams that would defend our networks in
cyber space. Those three sets of teams are the core construct
for what we’re working with and the services to develop our
cyber cadre.

55

100. Defense Cybersecurity: DOD’s Monitoring of Progress in
Implementing Cyber Strategies Can Be Strengthened, report GAO17-512, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office,
August 2017, available from http://gao.gov/assets/690/686347.pdf,
accessed August 22, 2017. Figure 1 of Defense Cybersecurity provides an organizational chart of the various cyber mission force
(CMF) teams within the USCYBERCOM and DoD organizational
and command structure.
101. DOJOC, p. 29.
102. Ibid., p. 38. Although cyberspace operations are not mentioned explicitly in the discussion of active and passive defenses,
cyberspace and electromagnetic activities (CEMA) efforts can
provide significant support to net-centric force operational tenets
as addressed below:
The increasingly net-centric joint force of the 21st Century
will capitalize on passive defense achieved through widely
dispersed forces. While still able to achieve operational
objectives through their ability to more efficiently
communicate, maneuver, and share a common operating
picture, net-centric forces will present a less lucrative target
for an adversary’s WMD. However, because adversaries
are more likely to use weapons capable of wide area effects
(e.g., Electromagnetic Pulse . . .) to attempt asymmetric
defeat of technologically superior US forces, improved
weapons-effects hardening/survivability will be required
for a broader range of joint force systems than required
today. Effective interoperability, robustness, and functional
redundancy between joint force units (particularly in the
areas of ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
and C2) will reduce the potential for single points of failure
within complex systems and organizations, and ensure
that critical C2 capabilities degrade gracefully. Information
assurance for net-centric forces will ensure only trusted data
are shared among users.

103. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
104. Deterrence means are those prescribed in DOJOC,
pp. 28-44.

56

105. DSB, Resilient Military Systems, p. 43. The report addresses
the challenges with providing cyber resiliency to a specific set
of conventional strike forces that directly support U.S. strategic
deterrence efforts:
Furthermore, cyber resiliency can only be achieved by
segmenting and isolating forces from general purpose
forces. In the absence of a cyber threat, segmented forces
are likely to possess slightly less capability than their nonsegmented counterparts due to the isolation from every part
of the supporting infrastructure which generates so much
advantage to DoD. However, in the face of an adversary
employing cyber, the segmented forces will provide far
more capability than their non-segmented counterparts.

106. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Major Combat Operations
Joint Operating Concept, Ver. 2.0, Washington, DC: Department
of Defense, December 2006, p. 43, available from http://www.
jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_combatops.
pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162012-383, accessed October 1, 2017. This
joint operating concept clearly identifies deterrence as an intimate
part of conflict operations:
A critical element of deterrence is maintaining capable and
rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary,
demonstrating the will to resolve conflicts decisively on
favorable terms. This will require forces to operate in and
from the global commons (space, international waters and
airspace, and cyberspace) and effectively project and sustain
forces in distant environments where adversaries may seek
to deny us access. (p. 6)

107. Mad Scientist: The 2050 Cyber Army Technical Report,
Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command G2, November 7, 2016, p. 25, available from http://info.
publicintelligence.net/USArmy-TRADOC-Cyber2050.pdf, accessed
October 8, 2016.
108. The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, p. 14. The fourth
strategic goal is described as:
During heightened tensions or outright hostilities, DoD
must be able to provide the President with a wide range
of options for managing conflict escalation. If directed,

57

DoD should be able to use cyber operations to disrupt an
adversary’s command and control networks, militaryrelated critical infrastructure, and weapons capabilities. As
a part of the full range of tools available to the United States,
DoD must develop viable cyber options and integrate those
options into Departmental plans. DoD will develop cyber
capabilities to achieve key security objectives with precision,
and to minimize loss of life and destruction of property.
To ensure unity of effort, DoD will enable combatant
commands to plan and synchronize cyber operations with
kinetic operations across all domains of military operations.

109. Ibid., p. 26.
110. James Blackwell, “Deterrence at the Operational Level of
War,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 2011, pp.
30-51. The Ten Axioms for Campaign Planners listed below are
addressed in:
Go to School on Deterrence and Nuclear Doctrine. . . .
Apply Deterrence in Each Phase of the Campaign. . . . Do
No Harm to the Stability of Central Strategic Deterrence. . . .
Understand the Limits of Conventional Deterrence. . . .
Plan for Operations on a Nuclear Battlefield. . . . Assess
the Credibility of Deterrence. . . . Beware the Potential for
Cascading Effects. . . . Leverage the Cognitive Domain of
War. . . . Do Not Assume Opponents without Fear Cannot Be
Deterred. . . . Develop Innovative Tactical and Operational
Forms. (pp. 36-49)

111. Jeffrey L. Caton, Army Support of Military Cyberspace Operations: Joint Contexts and Global Escalation Implications, Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2015,
pp. 37-53.
112. This image is modified from “Figure 9. Modified Kahn
Escalation Ladder,” in Jeffrey L. Caton, Army Support of Military
Cyberspace Operations: Joint Contexts and Global Escalation Implications, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2015, p. 38.
113. Ibid., p. 45. This figure is modified from “Figure 10. Relation of ACD to the Dynamics of Conflict and Escalation.”

58

114. DSB, Task Force on Cyber Deterrence, p. 6.
115. DSB, Resilient Military Systems, p. 33. Recommendation
number 2 of the report reads, “Determine the Mix of Cyber, Protected-Conventional, and Nuclear Capabilities Necessary for
Assured Operation in the Face of a Full-Spectrum Adversary.”
116. DSB, Task Force on Cyber Deterrence, p. 17. In discussion
of the report principle to “Create a Second-Strike Cyber Resilient
‘Thin Line’ Element of U.S. Military Forces,” the integration of
cyberspace, conventional, and nuclear strike is presented as:
DoD must therefore devote urgent and sustained attention
to boosting the cyber resilience of key U.S. strike systems
(cyber, nuclear, non-nuclear) – including essential supporting
forces and critical infrastructure to ensure we maintain
credible response capabilities. Without such measures, the
United States will not be able to effectively deter the most
sophisticated large-scale cyber attacks. . . . 2.1 Establish
a Highly Cyber Secure/Resilient ‘Thin Line’ of Strategic
Offensive Cyber, Nuclear, and Non-Nuclear Long-Range
Strike Capability. . . . Scalable military strike capabilities
– including offensive cyber, non-nuclear long-range strike,
and nuclear systems – are the foundation of U.S. deterrence
by cost-imposition. These strike capabilities will be targeted
by major powers’ cyber (and other) programs, and must
both be resilient and perceived as such. For these systems,
a perception of vulnerability is dangerous and destabilizing
[emphasis in original]. (pp. 17-18)

117. DOJOC, pp. 39-42.
Improving our capability to integrate nuclear and nonnuclear strike operations should further enhance these
[advanced conventional kinetic and non-kinetic] capabilities.
Providing the President an enhanced range of options for
both limiting collateral damage and denying adversaries
sanctuary from attack will increase the credibility of US
nuclear threats, thus enhancing deterrence and making the
actual use of nuclear weapons less likely. (p. 40)

118. Ibid., pp. 41-42. In the discussion of using Global Strike
to encourage adversary constraint, the document notes that:

59

In many cases where the adversary is convinced that the
cost of aggression or coercion will be a response using
nuclear Global Strike, other considerations tend to pale in
comparison. However, when an adversary perceives truly
severe consequences of restraint, and doubts US willingness
to use nuclear weapons, deterrence could fail despite our
nuclear capabilities. (p. 42)

119. FM 3-12, p. iv.
120. The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, pp. 25-26. The
cited task falls under “Strategic Goal III: Be Prepared to Defend
the U.S. Homeland and U.S. Vital Interests from Disruptive or
Destructive Cyberattacks of Significant Consequence.” The text
of the task is:
Assess DoD’s cyber deterrence posture and strategy.
Building off of the Defense Science Board’s [DSB] Task
Force on Cyber Deterrence, U.S. Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM), in coordination with the Joint Staff
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, will assess the
Department of Defense’s [DoD] ability to deter specific
state and non-state actors from conducting cyberattacks of
significant consequence on the U.S. homeland and against
U.S. interests, to include loss of life, significant destruction of
property, or significant impact on U.S. foreign and economic
policy interests [emphasis in original].

121. Ibid., p. 26.
122. DSB, Task Force on Cyber Deterrence, pp. 9-13. The report
offers guidance for developing tailored deterrence campaigns:
The U.S. cyber deterrence posture must be ‘tailored’ to cope
with the range of potential attacks that could be conducted
by each potential adversary. And it must do so in contexts
ranging from peacetime to ‘gray zone’ conflicts to crisis to
war. Clearly, for U.S. cyber deterrence (as with deterrence
more broadly), one size will not fit all.
Conducting detailed advance planning for responses to every
plausible cyber attack, with every potential adversary in
every conceivable scenario, is neither possible nor necessary.
Nor is it feasible to have in hand the ‘optimal’ response

60

to each hypothetical attack scenario. However, it is both
possible and essential to conduct systematic planning and
wargaming, to establish clear employment and declaratory
policies, and to establish priorities for the development of
a range of potential cyber and non-cyber (and military and
non-military) responses to cyber attacks. (p. 9)

123. The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, p. 10. A comprehensive U.S. cyber deterrence strategy should address:
As DoD builds its Cyber Mission Force [CMF] and overall
capabilities, DoD assumes that the deterrence of cyberattacks
on U.S. interests will not be achieved through the articulation
of cyber policies alone, but through the totality of U.S.
actions, including declaratory policy, substantial indications
and warning capabilities, defensive posture, effective
response procedures, and the overall resiliency of U.S.
networks and systems. The deterrence of state and non-state
groups in cyberspace will thus require the focused attention
of multiple U.S. government departments and agencies. The
Department of Defense [DoD] has a number of specific roles
to play in this equation.

124. “Stenographic Transcript, Foreign Cyber Threats,” January 5, 2017, p. 23.
125. Kevin R. Beeker, “Strategic Deterrence in Cyberspace:
Practical Application,” Graduate Research Project, No. AFIT/
ICW/ENG/09-01, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air
Force Institute of Technology, June 2009, pp. 18-20, available from
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a502250.pdf, accessed September 29, 2017.

61

APPENDIX I
See table I-I for a description of the specific cyberspace actions of U.S. Army Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) and table I-II for descriptions
of Army CEMA electronic warfare actions. Figure I-I
depicts the cyberspace and electronic warfare operations relationship with the joint cyberspace missions.
Cyberspace
Actions

Description

Cyberspace
Defense

Cyberspace defense are actions normally taken within the DOD
[Department of Defense] cyberspace for securing, operating,
and defending the DODIN [Department of Defense information
network] against specific threats. The purpose of cyberspace defense includes actions to protect, detect, characterize, counter,
and mitigate threats. (p. 1-9)

Cyberspace
Operational
Preparation of
the Environment
(OPE)

Cyberspace OPE consists of the non-intelligence enabling activities for the purpose of planning and preparing for ensuing
military operations. Cyberspace OPE requires forces trained to
a standard that prevents compromise of related intelligence collection operations. (p. 1-10)

Cyberspace
Security

Cyberspace security actions are those taken within a protected
network to prevent unauthorized access to, an exploitation of,
or damage to computers, electronic communications systems,
and other information technology, including platform information technology, as well as the information contained therein, to
ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality,
and nonrepudiation. Cyberspace security activities include vulnerability assessment and analysis, vulnerability management,
incident handling, continuous monitoring, and detection and
restoration capabilities to shield and preserve information and
information systems. (p. 1-10)

Cyberspace
Intelligence,
Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance
(ISR)

Cyberspace ISR is an intelligence action conducted by the .
. . [joint force commander] authorized by an execute order or
conducted by attached signals intelligence . . . units under temporary delegated . . . [signals intelligence] operational tasking
authority. Cyberspace ISR includes activities in cyberspace conducted to gather intelligence required to support future OCO
[offensive cyberspace operations] or DCO [defensive cyberspace
operations]. These activities support planning and execution of
current and future cyberspace operations. (p. 1-9)

Cyberspace
Attack

Cyberspace attack is a cyberspace action that creates various
direct denial effects in cyberspace (for example, degradation,
disruption, or destruction) and manipulation that leads to denial, that is hidden or that manifests in the physical domains.
The purpose of cyberspace attack is the projection of power to
provide an advantage in cyberspace or the physical domains for
friendly forces. (p. 1-10)

Table I-I. Army CEMA Cyberspace Actions1
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Electronic Warfare Actions

Description
Electronic Protection

[Electronic protection] involves actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and
equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the . . . [electromagnetic
spectrum] that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. For example, . . . [electronic protection] includes actions taken to ensure friendly use of the .
. . [electromagnetic spectrum], such as frequency agility in a radio or variable pulse
repetition frequency in radar. Commanders should avoid confusing . . . [electronic
protection] with self-protection. Both defensive . . . [electronic attack and electronic
protection] protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and equipment. However, . .
. [electronic protection] protects from the effects of . . . [electronic attack] (friendly
and enemy) and electromagnetic interference, while defensive . . . [electronic attack]
primarily protects against lethal attacks by denying enemy use of the . . . [electromagnetic spectrum] to guide or trigger weapons. (p. 1-28)
Electromagnetic compatibility

The ability of systems, equipment, and devices
that use the electromagnetic spectrum to operate
in their intended environments without causing
or suffering unacceptable or unintentional degradation because of electromagnetic radiation or
response. (p. 1-29)

Electromagnetic hardening

Action taken to protect personnel, facilities, and/
or equipment by blanking, filtering, attenuating,
grounding, bonding, and/or shielding against
undesirable effects of electromagnetic energy. (p.
1-29)

Electromagnetic spectrum
management

Planning, coordinating, and managing use of the
electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures. (p. 1-29)

Electronic masking

The controlled radiation of electromagnetic energy
on friendly frequencies in a manner to protect the
emissions of friendly communications and electronic systems against enemy electronic warfare
support measures . . . [signals intelligence] without
significantly degrading the operation of friendly
systems. (p. 1-29)

Emission control

The selective and controlled use of electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emitters to optimize command and control capabilities while minimizing,
for operations security: a. detection by enemy
sensors; b. mutual interference among friendly
systems; and/or c. enemy interference with the
ability to execute a military deception plan. (pp.
1-29–1-30)

Table I-II. Army CEMA Electronic Warfare Actions2
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Electronic Warfare Actions
Wartime reserve modes

Description
Characteristics and operating procedures of
sensors, communications, navigation aids, threat
recognition, weapons, and countermeasures systems that will contribute to military effectiveness
if unknown to or misunderstood by opposing
commanders before they are used, but could be
exploited or neutralized if known in advance. (p.
1-30)
Electronic Attack

[Electronic attack] involves the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or
anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent
of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. . . . [Electronic attack] includes—
•

Actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the . . .
[electromagnetic spectrum].

•

Employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism.

•

Offensive and defensive activities, including countermeasures. (p. 1-26)
Countermeasures

Form of military science that, by the employment
of devices and/or techniques, has as its objective
the impairment of the operational effectiveness of
enemy activity. (p. 1-27)

Electromagnetic deception

Electromagnetic deception is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to convey
misleading information to an enemy or to enemy
electromagnetic-dependent weapons, thereby
degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat
capability. (p. 1-27)

Electromagnetic intrusion

Intentional insertion of electromagnetic energy
into transmission paths in any manner, with the
objective of deceiving operators or of causing confusion. (p. 1-28)

Electromagnetic jamming

The deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection
of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy’s effective use of
the electromagnetic spectrum, and with the intent
of degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat
capability. (p. 1-28)

Table I-II. Army CEMA Electronic Warfare Actions
(cont.)
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Electronic Warfare Actions

Description

Electronic probing

Intentional radiation designed to be introduced
into the devices or systems of potential enemies
for the purpose of learning the functions and
operational capabilities of the devices or systems.
(p. 1-28)

Electromagnetic pulse

The electromagnetic radiation from a strong electronic pulse, most commonly caused by a nuclear
explosion that may couple with electrical or electronic systems to produce damaging current and
voltage surges. (p. 1-28)
Electronic Warfare Support

[Electronic warfare support] involves actions tasked by, or under direct control of,
an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize
sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the
purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future
operations. . . . [Electronic warfare support] enables U.S. forces to identify the electromagnetic vulnerability of an enemy’s or adversary’s electronic equipment and
systems. Friendly forces take advantage of these vulnerabilities through EW [electronic warfare] operations. (p. 1-30)
Electronic Intelligence

Technical and geolocation intelligence derived
from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic
radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. (p. 1-30)

Electronic Reconnaissance

The detection, location, identification, and evaluation of foreign electromagnetic radiations. (p. 1-30)

Electronics Security

The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information
of value that might be derived from their interception and study of noncommunications electromagnetic radiations, e.g., radar. (p. 1-31)

Spectrum Management Operations (SMO)
Spectrum management is the operational, engineering, and administrative procedures to plan, coordinate, and manage use of the electromagnetic spectrum and
enables cyberspace, signal and EW operations. Spectrum management includes
frequency management, host nation coordination, and joint spectrum interference
resolution. Spectrum management enables spectrum-dependent capabilities and
systems to function as designed without causing or suffering unacceptable electromagnetic interference. Spectrum management provides the framework to utilize the
electromagnetic spectrum in the most effective and efficient manner through policy
and procedure. (p. 1-34)

Table I-II. Army CEMA Electronic Warfare Actions
(cont.)
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Source: U.S. Army.

Figure I-I. Army Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare
Operations—Missions and Actions3
ENDNOTES – APPENDIX I
1. Field Manual (FM) 3-12, Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare
Operations, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of Army,
April 11, 2017, pp. 1-9–1-10, available from https://armypubs.army.
mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN3089_FM%203-12%20
FINAL%20WEB%201.pdf, accessed August 8, 2017, hereafter, FM
3-12.
2. FM 3-12, pp. 1-25–1-34.
3. Image modified from FM 3-12, p. 1-6.
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